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JURIES, HINDSIGHT, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARDS: FAILURES OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE CASE
FOR CHANGE
Richard Lempert*
INTRODUCTION
In their recent Arizona Law Review article entitled What Juries
Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance As a Risk Manager,' Profes-
sors Reid Hastie and W. Kip Viscusi purport to show that juries are
likely to do a poor job in setting punitive damages, largely because
jurors cannot avoid the influence of what is called "hindsight bias," or
the tendency to see the likelihood of an event higher in retrospect
than it would have appeared before it happened. In particular, they
argue that hindsight bias and other cognitive biases undermine the
utility of jury-set punitive damage awards as risk management devices.
They also present information which they think shows that judges do a
better job than juries in setting punitive damage levels. Their claims
are interesting, but they are either wrong or unsupported by the evi-
dence they present. In particular, if punitive damage awards are not a
useful risk management device, jury hindsight bias, as I shall show, is
not an important reason.
HASTIE AND Viscusi's ARTICLE
Hastie and Viscusi divide their article into two parts. The first part
reports an original study of the hindsight effect among jury-eligible
citizens.2 In this study, Hastie and Viscusi asked one group of sub-
jects, without telling them about an accident, to judge whether it is
reckless behavior to continue to send trains over a portion of track
* Francis A. Allen Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan
Law School and Visiting Fellow at the Russell Sage Foundation. Work on this paper has been
supported by the Cook Funds of the University of Michigan Law School and by the Russell Sage
Foundation. I would like to thank Reid Hastie for his generous cooperation in providing me
with information about the study which I critique and Ellen Dannin for a close and helpful
reading of an earlier version of this paper.
1. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk
Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. Rav. 901 (1998).
2. Id. at 904-08.
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that the National Transportation Safety Board has found dangerous. 3
They asked another group of subjects to make a similar judgement
knowing that an accident has happened. 4 The Hastie and Viscusi
study has the great virtue of attempting to use judges as a control
group.5 This is important. If a task, like setting punitive damages is
taken from the jury, it must be given to the judge if it is to be accom-
plished in litigation. Hastie and Viscusi believe their study shows that
juries exhibit substantial hindsight biases and that these biases are
substantially greater than the biases judges exhibit. 6 From this they
conclude that if punitive damages are aimed at risk management, the
task of setting them should be taken from juries and given to judges.7
We shall see, however, that their study design does not allow them to
conclude that they have found any hindsight bias, much less biases of
a magnitude that would justify inroads on the Seventh Amendment
and a major transfer of authority from juries to judges.
The second part of Hastie and Viscusi's article reviews some of
what we know about cognitive biases in human decision making and
suggests their implications for jury decision making on punitive dam-
ages.8 This part is largely speculative. Here, importantly, there is no
information about judges. Nor is there any reason, including, as we
shall see, the results of their empirical study, to regard judges as less
susceptible to cognitive biases than jurors.
SPONSORED BY EXXON
The Exxon corporation, which was assessed five billion dollars in
punitive damages following the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster, helped
fund the research which resulted in the paper by Hastie and Viscusi.9
The authors' recommendation in their conclusion, that the task of as-
sessing punitive damages be transferred from the jury to the judge, if
punitive damages are to be allowed at all is, no doubt, one that Exxon
finds congenial. It is tempting to dismiss this policy recommendation
and the research underlying it because of Exxon's sponsorship alone.
This would be a mistake. I have known Professor Hastie for years
and have even coauthored a paper on the hindsight effect with him.' 0
3. Id. at 905.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 904.
6. Id. at 906-07, 917.
7. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 917.
8. Id. at 909-16.
9. Id. at 901 n.**.
10. David Wasserman et al., Hindsight and Causality, 17 PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 30 (1991).
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Moreover, Hastie's early book, Inside the Jury, established a standard
for high quality jury simulation research which even today is too sel-
dom attained.11 I know from personal experience, that he is a fine
methodologist and I can also testify that he is a researcher of consider-
able integrity, as evidenced by his immediate willingness to share with
me the stimulus materials used in his study and unpublished data from
it, when he knew I was writing a critique. While I am not similarly
acquainted with Professor Viscusi, he has a national reputation as a
leader in the study of and movement to promote rational risk assess-
ment. Thus, the research reports of these scholars and the policy rec-
ommendations they derive from their research deserve careful
attention, regardless of who has paid for the study.
The sponsorship of this work, and the reason I mention it, however,
is relevant in one particular: Exxon is certain to welcome Hastie and
Viscusi's interpretation of their data, their more general assessment of
jury biases, and their resulting policy recommendations. Almost all of
Hastie and Viscusi's interpretations and recommendations seem con-
sistent with the Exxon Corporation's likely political agenda. It is na-
ive to assume that Exxon paid for this research from purely
eleemosynary motives. Rather, it seems likely that having paid for
this research, Exxon will seek to disseminate the authors' apparent
findings and their conclusions in judicial and political arenas where
they will help to make the case against jury awards of punitive dam-
ages. For this reason it is important that Hastie and Viscusi's research
and the conclusions drawn from it be carefully evaluated before the
results are disseminated. Ordinarily this might happen in a scholarly
journal's peer review process, but law reviews seldom subject social
science submissions to peer review. I hope that this commentary can
substitute in some degree for the peer review that a study like this
would ordinarily receive. 12
The lack of peer review is particularly important given what the au-
thors have written. I say this because, despite my respect for Hastie
and Viscusi and for the corpus of their work, I do not think that their
article would have survived social science peer review in its current
11. REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
12. Indeed, my comments at the Symposium where this paper was presented and on an earlier
draft of this article may already have served a peer review function to some degree. I know the
paper's treatment of the lack of statistical significance of the judicial hindsight data, see Hastie &
Viscusi, supra note 1, at 906, was changed to reflect comments I made at the Symposium. In
addition, both Professor Hastie and the editors of the Arizona Law Review had a chance to
review a draft copy of this paper before their editorial process was finished. Some of what I
wrote may have resulted in changes in the paper during the editing process, but fundamental
changes were not made, or else I would not be publishing this critique.
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form. In particular, there are many reasons why one may not safely
draw any policy recommendations from Hastie and Viscusi's article.
Moreover, their interpretation of the results of their original study and
their review of what others have found are often questionable and, at
places, untenable.
BASIC FAILINGS
Perhaps one can make an empirical case against entrusting the task
of setting punitive damages to juries. The authors, however, do not
make an adequate social science case for this change, and their recom-
mendation that this should be done deserves no weight in any policy
arena. In particular, the institution of punitive damages arguably has
nothing to do with risk management, so a system of punitive damages
can be justified without regard to its implications for risk manage-
ment. 13 But even if one treats punitive damages solely as a method of
risk management, showing that judges are less influenced by hindsight
than jurors (the intended empirical contribution of the Hastie and Vis-
cusi paper) does nothing to call the jury's role in setting punitive dam-
ages into question. Indeed, hindsight bias does more to undercut the
case for jury-determined punitive damage awards under traditional ra-
tionales for punitive damages than it does under Hastie and Viscusi's
risk management rationale. 14
An initial reason to be cautious about accepting Hastie and Vis-
cusi's conclusions is that neither their own research nor the research
they summarize in the second part of their paper involve delibera-
tions. Hastie and Viscusi despair of correcting cognitive biases, and in
particular of reducing hindsight bias through any debriefing proce-
dures, but they do not consider the possible efficacy of procedures
which not only acquaint jurors with the danger of these biases but also
encourage them to discuss these dangers in their deliberations.
In civil juries, there is often a wide range of damage estimates, and
the range is likely to be wider where the standard for damages has few
objective references, as is the case with punitive damages. 15 Normal
13. My own position is, however, that the implications of punitive damages for risk manage-
ment should not be ignored in the debate over punitive damages. If one assumes that punitive
damages are justified on a retributive justice theory alone, one could still conclude, if their impo-
sition substantially distorted efficient risk-taking, that the justice benefits they bring are not
worth their other social costs. Thus, the authors' research is relevant to the debate on punitive
damages. My concern is with the weight it should be given.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 20-27.
15. Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive
Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
870 [Vol. 48:867
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jury deliberations bring out reasons for these disparities and lead to
compromises between the estimates of high and low damage jurors.
To some extent, discussion itself may compensate for cognitive biases,
which are intrapsychic processes. Even more important for present
purposes is that, absent empirical investigation, one cannot know how
deliberations would be affected by judicial instructions designed to
counter hindsight and other biases. 16 The likelihood of some amelio-
rative effect is sufficiently plausible so that a social science case for
taking punitive damage judgements from juries cannot rest entirely on
studies that lack deliberations. As two co-authors and I have shown,
academic instruction in fields like psychology and medicine can re-
duce the influence of various cognitive failings, for even if these are
ingrained, they are not immutable. 17 Calling a jury's attention to the
existence of cognitive biases and encouraging jurors to consider their
possible effects in their deliberations may well have a similar amelio-
rative effect. 18 To the extent that Hastie and Viscusi are correct and
debriefing individuals is ineffective when the process is purely in-
trapersonal, providing information about cognitive biases cannot be
expected to reduce their impact on judges.
16. Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues suggest that deliberations would not change the er-
ratic nature of punitive damage awards beyond what one would expect from aggregating individ-
ual judgments into groups of six or twelve. Kahneman et al., supra note 15, at 68. I have also
heard Professor Sunstein report, at the Working Group on Behavioral Economics at the Russell
Sage Foundation, on unpublished data which indicate that deliberations do not make mock
juror punitive damage awards more consistent. When these data are published, we may have a
better idea of the effects of deliberations. Even if deliberations do not reduce the variability of
jury awards, they might still reduce the effects of certain cognitive biases, like the hindsight
effect. The articles I cited above are both authored by Professors Kahneman and Sunstein along
with Professor David Schkade of the University of Texas. See supra note 15. Both articles and
the study that Professor Sunstein orally reported on resulted from research that received funding
from the Exxon Corporation. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 15, at 2071 n.ttt. Thus, it
appears that Exxon is making a concerted effort to build a social science case for reducing or
taking away the jury's discretion in awarding punitive damages and that the Hastie and Viscusi
study is a part of this effort. Funding policy-relevant research is not illegitimate corporate be-
havior, but one must be wary when an interested party, with a conclusion it wants to reach and
potentially billions of dollars at stake, is the primary funder of research on an issue. Even if the
funded research is done to the highest social science standards, a strategic choice of what to fund
can paint a distorted picture of the empirical situation on which policy should rest. Indeed,
Exxon has recently cited the above research in its appeal of the $5.3 billion Exxon Valdez award.
Elizabeth Amon, Exxon Bankrolls Critics of Punitives, NAT'L L.J. May 17, 1999.
17. Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning, AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST, June 1988, at 431.
18. Hastie and Viscusi cite a study by Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski in which a
simple caution by a judge to non-deliberating mock jurors about the dangers of hindsight had no
ameliorative effect. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 915 nn. 28-29. They then go on to say that
no general remedies are known for hindsight effects. Id. at 916.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Turning to the first portion of Hastie and Viscusi's article, their em-
pirical study presents something of a puzzle, for even if one accepts its
results uncritically, the study's findings do not support the authors'
prime argument for taking punitive damages from the jury. Yet, if
their results were valid and reliable, they would support the authors'
policy recommendation for a reason they specifically disclaim.
Hastie and Viscusi state at the outset that they are concerned with
punitive damages only as a risk management device. 19 Under one
classic view of negligence, one might see the jury as filling a risk man-
agement function when it decides whether certain conduct is so risky,
in light of its likely benefits, as to constitute negligence, but this is not
the theory that justifies punitive damages. Punitive damages exist to
punish parties for harmful conduct that is deemed immoral, either be-
cause a legal duty was violated intentionally or because the conduct
was so reckless, given its potential for harm, that the carelessness itself
is regarded as immoral. Factors that juries are often explicitly invited
to consider in setting punitive damaages, such as the wealth of the
defendant, have no necessary relationship to either the likelihood or
the amount of harm done, two variables that are crucial to rational
risk management. 20
This does not mean that punitive damages have no implications for
risk management. Deterrence is often both a function and goal of
punishment, and one could expect the possibility of punitive dam-
ages-verified either by past personal experience (specific deterrence)
or observing the punishment of others (general deterrence)-to dis-
suade actors from intentional wrongdoing or reckless action. But de-
terrence is not the sole or even the primary justification for punitive
damages. Indeed, since a finding of negligence or some other wrong-
ful act must precede an award of punitive damages, deterrence-as
opposed to the perceived good of punishing immoral behavior-is
probably a less important justification for punitive damages than it is
for most criminal punishment. This is because the damages awarded
for the tortious behavior are supposed to compensate fully for the
harm done; in theory, the prospect of paying such damages, enhanced
by transaction costs, should deter most likely to be detected civil
wrongs.
But accepting Hastie and Viscusi's view that punitive damages
should be aimed at achieving efficient risk management, their study,
19. Id. at 902-03.
20. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI), Civil, 14.72.2 (8th ed. 1995).
[Vol. 48:867
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contrary to what they suggest, does not show that juries set punitive
damage awards at levels that are inappropriate for this purpose. Has-
tie and Viscusi's argument that jury punitive damage awards are too
high for efficient risk management is an argument for a first best
world. In our second best world, where many tort claims are not liti-
gated, where many law suits are settled without punitive damages, and
where few cases going to verdict involve awards of punitive damages,
it is likely (on the Hastie and Viscusi assumption that punitive dam-
ages have a legitimate role to play in risk management) that punitive
damages are too seldom rather than too often awarded. If so, "exces-
sive" awards in the few cases that give punitive damages may bring
the amount and impact of punitive damage awards in a given time
period closer to the socially optimum level than the levels which Has-
tie and Viscusi's proposed reform are likely to bring.
My argument is entirely speculative, for I have no idea what the
optimum level of punitive damages is from a risk management stand-
point. Nor am I confident that from a deterrence standpoint that an
excessive award in one case can compensate for an inadequate award
in another. But in our second best world, Hastie and Viscusi's argu-
ment that excessive punitive damages are awarded is equally specula-
tive, if not more so; particularly if, as some economic models suggest,
the total amount of punitive damages imposed is more important for
risk management purposes than the incidence of damages across
cases. This is because we know that many potentially valid tort claims
are not brought or, especially when harm is substantial, are settled for
less than the economic loss.
Hastie and Viscusi are, however, probably correct in arguing that
juries entrusted with the task of setting punitive damages are not good
risk managers.21 This is not necessarily because they award too much
in punitive damages, since, as I have just suggested, they may award
too little.22 Rather it is because, as Hastie and Viscusi point out, risk
management is a difficult business, and even professionals with infor-
21. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 902, 916-17.
22. Hastie and Viscusi seemed to have fallen into one of the cognitive traps they tell us juries
are vulnerable to. They focus largely on the "present-present" cell; that is, cases in which puni-
tive damages have been found justified and have been awarded by juries. They suggest that
awards in these cases have been excessive or are likely to be. They speculate about the "absent-
present" cell; that is, cases where punitive damages that are not justified are awarded, but in
theory at least, courts can preclude judgments of this sort by reversing jury verdicts or not in-
structing on punitive damages in the first instance.
Hastie and Viscusi ignore the "present-absent" cell; that is, cases in which punitive damages
are merited from a risk-management standpoint and are not awarded or are awarded in insuffi-
cient amounts. Under standard deterrence models which see the possibility of a trade-off be-
tween certainty and severity, one cannot evaluate whether deserved punitive damages are
1999]
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mation gathered specifically for risk management purposes have a dif-
ficult job doing it well.23 Moreover, jury trials are not aimed at
providing the information needed for optimum risk management, and
the system's constraints, such as those imposed by the rules of evi-
dence and adversarial experts, are poorly suited to rational risk man-
agement. These are, perhaps, reasons why punitive damages are not
justified primarily as a risk management device. They are certainly
reasons why risk management should not be their primary
justification.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND HINDSIGHT
Even if we do not reject Hastie and Viscusi's argument because they
misunderstand the rationale for punitive damages or because they are
writing for a first best world, their claim that it is hindsight bias that
makes juries poor risk managers is problematic. Contrary to what
their argument implies, from a risk management standpoint, hindsight
can be helpful. Indeed, when it comes to risk management, it is a
mistake to talk about a hindsight bias since ex post risk estimates are
likely to be more accurate than ex ante estimates. For example, esti-
mates of the risk of launching the Challenger space shuttle in cold
weather were probably far more accurate after it exploded than they
were before the tragic event.24 Once an event thought to be ex-
tremely rare happens, unless one has very good data to the contrary,
one should revise upwards estimates of the likelihood the event would
happen. Certainly, from a risk management standpoint the costs of
failing to take precautions against the event should be similarly raised.
For example, before the Exxon Valdez disaster, one might have dis-
missed as ridiculous the possibility that a major corporation would al-
low a person with a potential drinking problem to captain a
supertanker navigating perilous waters. After that disastrous oil spill,
we know more about how large corporate bureaucracies work and
about the low salience that environmental risks may have when corpo-
awarded in excessive amounts without knowing the amount of deserved punitive damages that
are never awarded.
Indeed, the situation is even more complex. If the negligence penalty is set to optimize deter-
rence, the appropriate amount of punitive damages depends on the degree to which the negli-
gence system fails to impose on tortfeasors the costs of their negligence. But to return to the
main point, Hastie and Viscusi's error in focusing only on punitive damages that are awarded
illustrates a point on which I think they and I agree: none of us, even the most intelligent, is
immune to cognitive biases.
23. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 916.
24. DIANE VAUGHN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURES
AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1995).
[Vol. 48:867
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rations make personnel decisions. Since additional valid information
leads us to perceive the risk of corporate irresponsibility as higher, it is
rational to put a higher price on such risk taking than we would have
before the accident happened. A high punitive damage award is a
way of signaling this price to other potential risk takers. While the
Alaskan jury's punitive damage award is a price set ex post from the
point of view of Exxon, the information it conveys about the potential
price of careless behavior is ex ante from the point of view of all oil
shippers, including Exxon, as they contemplate the appropriate de-
gree of future precautions. The jury, like any other risk manager, can
do nothing about a risk that has been realized. It can only aim at
establishing an efficient level of risk taking in the future. This is best
done with the help of hindsight. Hastie and Viscusi's demonstration
of jury hindsight bias would call the jury's performance as a risk man-
ager into question only if they could show that juries estimated acci-
dent probabilities more accurately before rather than after they
happened. They have not done this, and in many situations they could
not do this because the additional information often will lead to more
accurate judgments.
Whether a jury would be misled by hindsight in a situation where ex
post risk assessments are worse than ex ante assessments is an open
question. Consider a vaccine that has been used 20,000,000 times with
a serious adverse reaction once in every 50,000 doses. If a jury trying
a case brought by someone who had suffered an adverse reaction esti-
mated the risk at more than one in 50,000, we could regard their
judgement as distorted by a hindsight bias that would, in a first best
world, hamper efficient risk management. Hastie and Viscusi should
have used a situation like the vaccine situation to test their hypotheses
that hindsight bias makes juries poor risk managers. Had they done
so, a hindsight bias might not have emerged. Although I do not dis-
pute the susceptibility of all humans to hindsight bias, a well-estab-
lished incidence rate may counter hindsight's distorting effects. On
the other hand, when no likely valid baseline exists, as with rare
events like the Challenger disaster, the Exxon Valdez incident, or the
hypothetical case that Hastie and Viscusi chose to study, the informa-
tion that hindsight brings is likely, from a risk management stand-
point, to make for better rather than worse decisions.25
25. Hastie and Viscusi make the point that people might overestimate risks that are novel or
that are associated with highly publicized accidents. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 910, 912.
This may be, but litigation allows a party to put an unusual accident or novel risk in context, just
as in the vaccine hypothetical I use, the company can show how unlikely an adverse reaction
was. The large punitive damage awards that Hastie and Viscusi point to do not show that juries
1999]
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It is puzzling that Hastie and Viscusi chose to address the hindsight
bias problem only from a risk management standpoint, because the
traditional justification for punitive damages as punishment is more
threatened than the risk management perspective by the hindsight bi-
ases that Hastie and Viscusi think they show. If punitive damages are
intended to punish actors for the immoral action of intentionally or, in
the case that concerns us, recklessly endangering the well being of
others, the recklessness of the conduct should be determined from the
actor's ex ante perspective, because if the conduct was reasonably
viewed as not reckless when it occurred, the actor's behavior was not
so immoral as to justify punishment. Indeed, if a rational, careful ac-
tor would not have seen the possibility that her action would cause
harm or would only have foreseen harm whose social costs were out-
weighed by the costs of taking precautions, the actor should not be
found negligent at all and surely has not behaved so badly as to justify
punitive damages. Hindsight bias can lead to unjustified punitive
damage awards, because overestimates of ex ante risk probabilities
can make behavior which appeared reasonable at the time it occurred
appear reckless in retrospect. The awards are unjustified, not because
they over-deter risk taking, but because they punish tortfeasors for
behavior that did not appear reckless when it occurred.
EXTERNAL VALIDITY PROBLEMS AND DESIGN FLAWS
No doubt, the ex ante probabilities of accidents are often overesti-
mated in retrospect because hindsight biases are a well-documented
fact of human cognition. If the overestimation were of the magnitude
which Hastie and Viscusi report (i.e., powerful enough to double-
from 33% to 67%)26 the ex ante likelihood of a punitive damage
award, there would be considerable reason to worry about the justice
of these awards. But the Hastie and Viscusi study tells us almost noth-
ing about the likely magnitude of inappropriate hindsight effects on
punitive damage verdicts. The study's external validity is sufficiently
low, given the many differences between the experimental conditions
and the situations of actual juries, that generalizing from the study's
results to actual juries would be risky. This is true even if the study
did not also have design flaws so substantial as to undercut its experi-
mental findings.
are unable to place accidents in context, for a desire to punish rather than risk management can
explain the size of large awards.
26. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 906. This increase is higher than the authors' study
would justify even if the study did not have fatal design flaws. See infra text accompanying notes
32-44.
[Vol. 48:867
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There are problems I have already alluded to, namely the absence
of deliberations and the fact that the study does not tell us that jury
verdicts, as opposed to juror verdicts, are affected by knowing an acci-
dent happened. Also, the jury's task in Hastie and Viscusi's foresight
condition differed in important respects from the task it faced in the
hindsight condition. In the foresight condition, respondents were
asked whether to order the railroad to cease potentially dangerous
operations,27 while in the hindsight condition respondents were asked
if they would award punitive damages. 28 Even if the standards for
deciding the two questions were artificially made the same, as the ex-
perimenters tried to do, other values, such as a reluctance to have the
government order private parties to behave in certain ways may have
depressed the level of "anti-railroad" verdicts in the foresight condi-
tion. This may be why the verdict differences Hastie and Viscusi re-
port are proportionally larger than differences in variables that more
directly measure the effect of hindsight. Also, and more consequent-
ial as I shall show in detail below, 29 the legal judgment that the fore-
sight and hindsight jurors were asked to make was different, as was
the information given to them.
In addition, the Hastie and Viscusi study uses as its stimulus a fif-
teen minute videotape which embodies a script of less than 3,000
words.30 The study's mock jurors receive so much less information
than jurors receive in actual trials that there is no scientific basis for
assuming that the magnitude of the effects found in the study resem-
bles those found in actual trials. Moreover, in a trial where a high
punitive damage award is possible, the defense counsel will, no doubt,
emphasize both the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, given
what was known before the accident, and the jury's obligation to take
an ex ante perspective in deciding on punitive damages. Evidence and
arguments about the situation ex ante might diminish substantially the
effects of hindsight and perhaps even eliminate them. Even if jurors
who are told to take an ex ante perspective cannot do this, jurors who
are not only told to do this but who are also immersed in evidence that
seeks to reconstruct the defendant's ex ante perspective may be able
to do so. We simply do not know what is possible in this regard, par-
27. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 905.
28. Id.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 31-44.
30. A more detailed description of the studies methods can be found in Reid Hastie et al.,
Juror Judgment in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Liability Judgments, CRJP Technical Report
#376 (1998), cited in Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 905 n.9. I am grateful to Professor Hastie
for sending me copies of this unpublished report and of the stimulus materials he used in his
study.
1999]
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ticularly when the decision will be made only after substantial
discussion.
Another flaw stems from an important difference between Hastie
and Viscusi's hindsight and foresight conditions. In the hindsight con-
dition, the jurors were told that the defendant railroad had already
been found negligent. 31 Thus, any hindsight juror who knew a bit
about negligence law might think that the experimenter wanted them
to assume that the railroad should have foreseen the possibility of the
accident. The possibility of experimenter demand effects is substan-
tial. Moreover, the hindsight juror's task differs substantially from the
foresight juror's task. Foresight jurors had to determine if an accident
was foreseeable and, if so, whether it was so likely that to ignore the
possibility was reckless; hindsight jurors only needed to answer the
latter question because the first question had been answered when
negligence was found.
Even if hindsight and foresight jurors are identically situated, it is
not clear that ex post information is irrelevant to punitive damage as-
sessments. Punishment judgments are regularly informed by the exist-
ence and extent of the harm they are punishing. In real life situations,
unless there has been an accident and harm done by it, punitive dam-
ages are likely to be unavailable or not awarded regardless of how
dangerously a party has behaved. For example, a person who acciden-
tally discharges a gun and is lucky enough not to hit anyone will prob-
ably face no penalty, even if the discharge is reported to the police.
But if the person accidentally kills someone, she is likely to be prose-
cuted for negligent homicide or maybe manslaughter, even though the
recklessness associated with the accidental discharge is the same in
both cases. From the punishment point of view, being guided by ex
post information in deciding how punitive to be may not be as
counter-normative as I am willing to assume for purposes of
discussion.
FATAL FLAWS
The other differences between Hastie and Viscusi's foresight and
hindsight conditions are even more serious than the fact that only
hindsight jurors were told the railroad had been found negligent. One
difference means that the judgments of Hastie and Viscusi's hindsight
subjects may have been appropriate and, at a minimum, cannot be
31. Hindsight Jury Opinion Study, Durango River Hatchery v. Chicago W. R.R. 2 (on file
with DePaul Law Review).
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strictly contrasted with the judgments of subjects in the foresight con-
dition. The other difference invalidates the study's results entirely.
The authors' foresight condition involved a regulatory action (or-
dering the railroad to cease using a roadbed). 32 Because of this, Has-
tie and Viscusi's foresight subjects are reporting their own judgments
about the likely dangers of the railroad's continued operations. In the
hindsight condition, the experimental subjects are deciding what the
railroad should have known. Knowing an accident occurred, people
who are unaffected by hindsight bias and so would maintain their ex
ante accident probability estimates might nonetheless reassess their
estimates of the likelihood that an expert organization, like a railroad,
could have foreseen an accident. For example, knowing what we
know about the Challenger disaster, we might conclude that NASA
was reckless in not foreseeing the accident's possibility because the
possibility was substantial enough and the accident occurred through a
sufficiently obvious causal mechanism that an expert organization that
put the safety of its astronauts first would have foreseen it. Had there
not been the explosion, we might have given an inferior estimate of
the ex ante probability from NASA's perspective because we would
not have known nearly so much about the causes of the explosion and
so could not have judged NASA's capacity to anticipate them. Even
more important, if we could avoid hindsight bias, in the sense that our
own ex post estimate of the chance of an explosion would be the same
as our ex ante estimate, this very lack of consistency might mean that
our estimate would not be a good one. Furthermore, it is not the le-
gally relevant one. The legally relevant estimate in the Hastie and
Viscusi experiment is the one that the railroad, as an expert organiza-
tion, should have made ex ante and not the one that the lay jurors
would have made had they been deciding before the accident whether
to continue rail shipments.
This difference is worth mentioning not only because it poses an
interesting and subtle challenge to the authors' results, but also be-
cause it is likely to compound the problems caused by the second ma-
jor difference in the two conditions, one which reflects a design flaw at
the heart of the Hastie and Viscusi experiment. In the foresight condi-
tion subjects were told in the experimental protocol in a section la-
beled Possible Impact of a Derailment:
There has never been a derailment at the Andara bridge. Further-
more, typically when derailments occur, the impact is quite limited. If
cargo spills on the ground from overturned cars, it requires cleanup
by the railroad, but the mess is usually limited to the area immedi-
32. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 905.
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ately surrounding the accident. However, should a car fall from a
bridge into a river, there is the possibility of material entering the
river and being carried downstream.
Trains traversing the Andara bridge are usually made up of a hun-
dred or so cars, most of which are empty. The loaded cars carry dry
materials, like gravel, coal, and lumber, that do not dissolve in
water. If such materials got into the river they would not be carried
very far downstream. One exception is detergent. In many trains
there is a single tank car of detergent. Should that tank car fall in the
river and if it were to be punctured, detergent could spill into the
river. It would kill fish as well as vegetation along the river as it was
carried downstream. Businesses that depend on sport fishing in the
river and the operations of a large trout hatchery could be
disrupted.33
The protocol given to the hindsight subjects says nothing about the
likely minimal impact of most derailings; indeed, it says nothing about
the likely impact of a derailing at all except to note, in a subsection
labeled Arrangement of Loaded and Empty Cars, that eighty-six of the
ninety-seven cars in the train that derailed were empty and eleven
were loaded.34 Rather, it tells the mock jurors35 that a car carrying
19,000 gallons of detergent was one of six cars that derailed, that it
was punctured by a rock and that the trout hatchery was, "devastated
and may never recover."36 Moreover, foresight subjects are told in the
section labeled Summary of the NTSB Order and Trial, that there has
not been a derailment at the bridge in the twenty years since it went
into service 37 and this is repeated in the opening sentence of the para-
graph on possible impacts that is quoted above.38 Hindsight subjects
receive the same introductory information about there being no de-
railment since the bridge went into service, but the matter is not again
repeated for them.39
So not only were the foresight subjects deciding as regulators and
not as jurors, but they had highlighted for them the fact that there had
never been an accident on the bridge and they were told that most
33. Foresight Jury Opinion Study, Chicago W. R.R. v. National Transp. Safety Bd. 5 (on file
with DePaul Law Review) (emphasis added). Section headings in the protocol are set in bold
type, and major categories, but not subcategories are underlined. I am grateful to Professor
Hastie for supplying me with this protocol and with the equivalent protocol for the Hindsight/
Jury condition.
34. Hindsight Jury Opinion Study, supra note 31, at 4.
35. Not all of Hastie and Viscusi's subjects were deciding as mock jurors, some were asked to
decide as citizens. We will talk of "jurors" now, but later we will examine some of the implica-
tions of differences between the citizen and juror conditions.
36. Hindsight Jury Opinion Study, supra note 31, at 5-6
37. Foresight Jury Opinion Study, supra note 33, at 2.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Hindsight Jury Opinion Study, supra note 31, at 2.
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derailments would do little damage beyond imposing clean up costs
that could be borne by the railroad. They were also primed to think
that there was only a one in 100 chance that an accident might cause
serious harm,40 and they thought that the most serious harm that
might occur would be that the operations of a fish hatchery might be
disrupted. The hindsight subjects, asked to decide as jurors, cannot be
expected to mimic the judgments of foresight subjects because their
view of the situation ex ante, totally apart from knowing that an acci-
dent occurred, differs from what the foresight subjects knew. Hind-
sight subjects did not know that cars carrying dry material would
cause little harm to the river if they derailed, and they did not know
that only one in about 100 cars in a train carries detergent. They knew
that the car that derailed carried detergent,41 from which it is reason-
able to infer that cars carrying detergent are not uncommon, and they
knew that the derailment of a car carrying detergent devastated the
fish hatchery;42 whereas, the foresight subjects thought it could, at
most, disrupt its operations.43 Also the experimental design makes
the fact that there has never been an accident on the Andara bridge
more salient for the foresight than for the hindsight subjects. 44 Given
these differences in the hindsight and foresight protocols, had the ex-
periment not revealed a difference between the judgments of hind-
sight and foresight subjects that looks like a hindsight effect, it would
have been surprising.
None of this means that jurors do not exhibit hindsight bias. Given
the seeming ubiquity of this bias in human decision making, it is likely
they do. But the design of the Hastie and Viscusi experiment destroys
the social science bases for attributing any of the judgmental differ-
ence in their experiment to the existence of hindsight bias. Factual
differences between the two protocols impel hindsight jurors to give
estimates of the chance of a serious accident that are higher than the
estimates of foresight jurors, and these higher estimates should carry
over, as they apparently did, to a greater willingness to treat ordering
rail shipments over the Andara bridge as reckless behavior. If Hastie
and Viscusi's subjects were immune to hindsight bias, the different
40. The foresight subjects might have realized, had they thought about it, that derailments
often involve more than one car; nevertheless, the information that no more than one in a hun-
dred cars would ordinarily contain detergent is a likely anchor in thinking about the probability
of a serious accident.
41. Hindsight Jury Opinion Study, supra note 31, at 5.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Foresight Jury Opinion Study, supra note 33, at 5.
44. Id. at 2, 5.
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conditions might still elicit markedly different accident estimates and
punitive damage awards.
COMPARISON WITH JUDGES
The most original aspect of Hastie and Viscusi's study is their at-
tempt to collect data on the hindsight biases of judges similar to that
which they collected on jurors.45 As Hastie and Viscusi recognize,
transferring decision making responsibility from the jury to the judge
makes little sense unless the judge is likely to do a better job.46 I
commend Hastie and Viscusi for understanding this, since many critics
of jury decision making have not, and for trying to collect data that
deal with the relative capacities of judges and jurors to ignore what
they know from hindsight. However, contrary to what they tell us, we
cannot conclude from their research, and could not even if the above
design problems did not exist, that judges are less susceptible to hind-
sight bias than jurors.
In the first place, Hastie and Viscusi exaggerate the juror hindsight
bias which their research reveals. The measure of juror hindsight bias
which figures most prominently in their paper is the increase which
their data show in punitive damage verdicts, from 33% in the foresight
condition to 67% in the hindsight condition.47 I have already sug-
gested reasons why this change in verdicts may reflect legitimate uses
of the information that hindsight provides rather than uses which vio-
late legal norms. But totally apart from this, the number appears too
high, for the authors unaccountably do not report a manipulation
which proved significant in the study on which the first portion of the
paper is based.48
In the underlying study, Hastie and his colleagues (Viscusi was not a
coauthor) divided their jury-eligible citizens into two groups, one of
which was told to respond as ordinary citizens to the question of
whether punitive damages should be awarded and the other of which
was asked to decide on punitive damages as if they were jurors. 49
While 75% of subjects taking the citizen role would have found the
railroad liable for punitive damages 50 only 59% of subjects taking the
juror role would have done so.51 Moreover, 37% of the subjects that
45. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 905.
46. Id. at 917.
47. Id. at 906, 917.
48. For a fuller report of this study, see Hastie et al., supra note 30.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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were told to act as jurors would have awarded punitive damages in the
foresight condition.5 2 Line One of my Table One presents this infor-
mation. It is only subjects asked to take the juror role who can appro-
priately be called mock jurors, so the hindsight effect in the first row
of Hastie and Viscusi's Table One should increase from 37% to 59%,
not from 33% to 67%. But even this number exaggerates hindsight
bias, for it is a measure of verdict preferences and not a measure of
the estimated chance of an accident in the hindsight and foresight con-
ditions. Hastie and Viscusi directly measure the difference between ex
ante and ex post evaluations of risk, as they ask for estimates of the
probability of a serious accident.5 3 In the foresight condition, their
mock juror subjects had an average probability assessment of .37,
while mock jurors in the hindsight condition set the probability at .56.
The comparable figures for judges are .20 and .36.
TABLE ONE
VERDICT PREFERENCES AND ACCIDENT PROBABILITY ASSESSMENTS
FOR MOCK JUROR SUBJECTS, CITIZEN SUBJECTS, AND JUDGES
5 4
Mock Juror Subjects Citizen Role Subjects Judges
Foresight Hindsight Hindsight Foresight Hindsight Hindsight Foresight Hindsight Hindsight
n=51 n=87 Increment n=51 n=88 Increment n-47 n=47 Increment
Verdicts
(percent 37% 59% 59% 29% 75% 159% 15% 25% 67%
anti-rail-
road)
Probabil-
ity of a .37 .56 51% .32 .63 97% .20 .36 80%
serious
accident
Contrary to the authors' suggestions, these data do not indicate that
judges are less susceptible to hindsight biases than jurors. The acci-
dent probability assessments of the mock jurors' increased with hind-
sight by .19, while the judges' estimates increased by .16, not a
statistically significant difference. Moreover, relative to their foresight
judgments, the mock jurors' assessments of the accident probability
increased by 51% with hindsight, but the average judicial estimate in-
creased by 80%. With respect to verdicts, the proportion of mock ju-
rors finding against the railroad increased by 22%, which is a 59%
increase over the base established in the foresight condition. The ab-
52. Id.
53. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at tbl.1.
54. The data for this table were supplied to me by e-mail message from Professor Hastie dated
September 12, 1998. The Hindsight Increment is defined as: (Hindsight-Foresight)/Foresight.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
solute increase in the judges anti-railroad verdicts was only ten per-
centage points, but this is a 67% increase over the existing base.
The difference between the judges and mock jurors that stands out
is one that Hastie and Viscusi do not comment on: the difference in ex
ante verdicts and probability estimates. As Table One indicates, the
average judicial estimate of the probability of a serious accident in the
foresight condition is only 20%, while the average mock juror's esti-
mate is 37%, and only 15% of the judges in the foresight condition
would have prevented the railroad before the accident from using
tracks the National Transportation Safety Board found dangerous,
while 37% of the mock jurors would have done so. This difference in
base line estimates is similar though not as extreme if one looks at
subjects responding as concerned citizens.
These differences in foresight condition estimates suggest that Has-
tie and Viscusi's judges had values or experiences that differed from
those of the citizens who participated in their study. Differences in
the hindsight condition seem in large measure to be a function of dif-
ferences in the foresight base line and so are profoundly affected by
the same differences in values and experiences. Judges may not be
less susceptible to hindsight effects than jurors, but their values or ex-
periences may make them more resistant to finding businesses liable
for punitive damages or less likely to think that businesses would push
to engage in activities that had a high risk of serious accidents.
Moreover, although Hastie and Viscusi speculate that the judicial
role or experience of judging might insulate judges from hindsight bi-
ases,55 their judge data may simply reflect sample biases which affect
the base line measures and restrain absolute (but not relative) shifts
caused by hindsight. The judges in the Hastie and Viscusi study were
attending a program in law and economics, which may well have at-
tracted judges who are more pro-business than judges generally.56
Moreover, the Hastie and Viscusi sample included appellate judges. 57
Trial judges, as a group, may have different values or, because their
experiences differ, they may respond differently in hindsight. This is
important because if Hastie and Viscusi's suggestions were adopted, it
is the trial judges rather than appellate judges who, in the first in-
stance, would be assessing punitive damages. Of course if trial judges
had this role, corporations like Exxon would have a special incentive
to fund local judicial elections or lobby for trial judge appointments,
55. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 917.
56. Id. at 905.
57. Id.
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and those chosen as trial judges might be more likely to have values
that those potentially exposed to punitive damages would welcome.
Perhaps the biggest puzzle presented by Table One is the substan-
tial difference between citizens asked to reach decisions as citizens
and those asked to reach decisions as jurors. It is the group of citizens
deciding as citizens which drives the hindsight effect differences that
Hastie and Viscusi report. I hesitate to venture an explanation for
this, and it is possible that the differences, particularly the difference
in average accident probability estimates, are due to chance. Yet the
difference in the magnitude of the hindsight effect in the verdict con-
dition is not only statistically significant, but it is also so large (46%
versus 22%) as to be striking. A possible explanation is that just being
asked to think about a problem as a juror curbs tendencies to view a
problem in hindsight. Alternatively, the mock juror subjects may
have felt that they needed to be more cautious than the citizen role
subjects in awarding punitive damages because their role had them
making a decision with consequences. If either of these explanations
is true, actual juror verdicts should be affected even less by hindsight
than the verdicts of the juror subjects in this study because actual ju-
rors will not be playing a role; rather, they will know their decisions
matter.
If I am correct and what Hastie and Viscusi see as the lesser suscep-
tibility of judges (as compared to jurors) to hindsight bias instead re-
flects differences in values and experiences-exaggerated perhaps by
sample biases-there is no cause to celebrate the advantage that Has-
tie and Viscusi believe judges enjoy. If the goal is to achieve a just
result that is also sensible from a risk management standpoint, the
fundamental question is which group's estimates in foresight and in
hindsight are more accurate. We do not know whether judges' or ju-
rors' estimates are more accurate, and Hastie and Viscusi's article
does not address this issue.
There are other problems with Hastie and Viscusi's empirical re-
search and the conclusions they draw from it. At one point they use
Learned Hand's well known formula for negligence to suggest the ac-
cident probability a subject should have to find the railroad negligent
(ignoring the fact that the hindsight subjects had been told the rail-
road had been found negligent)5 8 They then calculate benefit/cost
ratios associated with the award of punitive damages where the costs
58. Hastie and Viscusi describe Judge Hand's formula as follows: "If an accident's cost multi-
plied by its probability of occurrence exceeds the cost of untaken precautions, then in the event
of a mishap, the defendant should be judged at least negligent." Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1,
at 907.
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are the cost to the railroad of taking the precautions that would have
prevented the accident, and the benefits are the damages done in the
accident multiplied by the ex ante probability estimate for each subject
that the accident would occur.59 They seem to regard the fact that no
judge awarded punitive damages with a subjective benefit/cost ratio of
less than 3.65 as a good thing for Hastie and Viscusi feel that their
calculations suggest that "judges have a sense of rationality in situa-
tions believed to create the most irrationality. '60 But there is no rea-
son to believe that a benefit/cost ratio of 3.65 is an appropriate
threshold for finding that conduct was so reckless as to merit punitive
damages. Indeed, in the legal world in which we live punitive dam-
ages may be awarded when actual damages are only nominal, so very
small benefit/cost ratios are consistent with legal norms. 61 Thus, the
arguably greater sensitivity of judges to benefit/cost ratios in awarding
punitive damages, something else they purport to show, does not
mean that their judges' punitive damage awards are normatively supe-
rior to their mock juror awards. 62 Indeed, it does not even mean that
59. Id. at 908.
60. Id.
61. Where punitive damages are awarded although damages are small or nominal, one might
expect to find that the breach of duty is intentional rather than reckless, but behavior can be so
reckless as to justify punitive damages even though by happenstance the damages done are
small. To the extent a benefit/cost ratio is a guide to the recklessness of behavior, the cost
measure should not be the harm actually done by the behavior but the harm that would have
reasonably been expected to have occurred in the event of an accident. In calculating their
benefit/cost ratios, Hastie and Viscusi use the harm actually done in the accident, which for some
people may be lower than the harm which they thought the railroad should have anticipated ex
ante.
62. This portion of the analysis too is highly questionable. Whether damages are low or high,
Hastie and Viscusi's data indicate that their mock jurors are quite sensitive to benefit/cost ratios;
the higher the ratio the greater the probability of a ruling against the railroad. What seems
irrational in the data is that among the "citizen mock jurors" who were told that damages were
$240,000, a very low benefit/cost ratio (.04-.10) was needed to elicit the same tendencies to award
punitive damages that it took a high benefit/cost ratio (4.17-10.44) to elicit among the jurors told
that the accident had caused $24 million in damages. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 921 tbl.3.
These data are interesting and deserve further exploration. But they do not necessarily reveal
counter-normative behavior by jurors, nor do they show judges performing better than jurors.
As constructed, the benefit/cost ratios are sensitive to each respondent's judged likelihood of a
serious accident. The data simply show that regardless of damages, those who thought that the
railroad should have anticipated there would be a serious accident if they continued to use the
track, were more likely to award punitive damages than those who thought an accident less
foreseeable, an entirely normative result in both the low and high damages conditions.
Hastie and Viscusi did not provide their judges with a scenario in which damages were low.
Had such a condition been part of the judge study, I expect that many of them too would have
awarded punitive damages despite low benefit/cost ratios because they, like the low damage
jurors, would have thought that the railroad should have anticipated the accident and merited
punishment for not doing so. Even from a risk management standpoint, the apparent inconsis-
tency between the low and high damage award mock jurors is not necessarily counter normative.
It is possible that in looking ahead to the next accident or, considering what damages might have
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the judge's awards are superior from a deterrence standpoint. If
judges never award punitive damages when benefit/cost ratios are low
and award them only half the time when they are high, actors, like the
railroad, involved in the experiment's accident and other railroads,
may be overly prone to risky operations in the future. Certainly noth-
ing about the theory of punitive damages or risk management through
tort awards suggests that a benefit/cost ratio of at least 3.65 should
exist before punitive damages are awarded.
THE LITERATURE ON COGNITIVE BIASES
The Hastie and Viscusi study is a modest one with a simple stimu-
lus, with limited and legally ambiguous result measures, and with pos-
sible sample biases, to name just some of its problems. Nevertheless,
valuable lines of social science research often begin with modest first
steps. If Hastie and Viscusi's data analysis and their willingness to
draw policy conclusions from their findings were as modest as their
study, I would not have written this critique. However, Hastie and
Viscusi put far more weight on their empirical work than it will bear.
Moreover, even if their work were better done and the results less
open to questions, no single social science study or small group of
studies can justify as dramatic a change in a long standing legal institu-
tion, like punitive damages, as that which Hastie and Viscusi propose.
Their exaggeration of their study's import is particularly unfortu-
nate given that a sponsor of the work has a strongly partisan interest
in the results and may seek to publicize the study's conclusions in pol-
icy arenas that are poorly equipped to appreciate the study's serious
occurred in the accident they knew about, low and high damage jurors were closer in their esti-
mates of the damages that might have been foreseen (or would occur next time) than they were
in the actual damage figures provided them. Hastie and Viscusi asked their mock jurors to esti-
mate the ex ante chances of a accident but they never ask them to estimate the damage it might
cause.
In addition, in looking at the association of risk perceptions with judgments against the rail-
road, Hastie and Viscusi make the judges as a group look more rational than they are by ignor-
ing data from half their judges on the ground that so few judges in the foresight condition would
have found against the railroad that the relationship between judges and risk perception is "in-
sensitive." Id. at 906. In fact, there are only four fewer judges finding against the railroad in the
foresight condition than in the hindsight condition (7 versus 11). Ignoring the foresight condi-
tion means that the authors do not tell us that six judges ruled against the railroad with lower
perceptions of accident risk than many of their fellow judges who did not award punitive dam-
ages, including 10 of the 11 judges whose risk ratings were in the highest quartile. Even if four
more judges with risk perceptions in the highest quartile had voted for punitive damages, the
data would have suggested that foresight judges as a group did not show a strong relationship
between willingness to award punitive damages and their risk assessments. By ignoring the data
from the foresight judges, Hastie and Viscusi make the judges as a group appear more rationally
consistent than they seem to have been.
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shortcomings. But rather than being ultra-cautious in their analysis to
be sure their work was not misused, Hastie and Viscusi attempt to
bolster the results of their empirical study with a broader discussion of
empirical studies of lay judgment of uncertain risks. 63 This discussion
too is seriously flawed. It draws questionable implications from the
best of the research it cites, and it offers additional speculations that
are poorly grounded in empirical research, if they are grounded at all.
In short, the second part of their article, like the first part, offers no
reason to transfer punitive damage judgements from juries to judges.
At the most general level, the studies that report common failings
of human reasoning give us little reason to expect that judges will out-
perform jurors. These studies usually involve individual rather than
collective decisions, and few are set in a context designed to mimic
legal decision making. Although much of the research on cognitive
biases and other failures of human reasoning is well done and calls our
attention to failures of rationality that are likely to affect juror deci-
sions because they seem endemic to human reasoning, even here there
is need for caution.
For example, we are told that jurors are likely to overestimate the
likelihood of accidents with small probabilities of occurrence. 64 But
this argument is based on studies which typically involve far less case
specific information about risk than jurors receive at trials. Moreover,
if a risk can be shown to be so low that it is not careless to incur it, a
tort defendant will be entitled to a directed verdict, and a jury will
never hear the matter. In addition, when the issue is punitive dam-
ages, overestimating a tiny risk by orders of magnitude may still lead
to a risk estimate that is so small that unless an outcome was cata-
strophic, punitive damages will either be ruled inappropriate as a mat-
ter of law or will not be imposed by a jury. The best empirical
evidence that there is a problem here would be cases in which the
human tendency to overestimate very small risks led to awards of pu-
nitive damages not justified by true risk levels. Significantly, the au-
thors identify no cases in which jurors awarding punitive damages
apparently did so because of this or any of the other cognitive failures
they discuss. We might still wish to think about ways to minimize cog-
nitive failures that might affect jury verdicts, but, absent cases in
which these failures seem to have led to unfairness or irrationality, it is
hard to see a problem that justifies such a broad institutional change
as moving the punitive damage decision from juries to judges.
63. Id. at 906-16.
64. Id. at 910-11.
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A further problem with the argument in the second part of their
article is that the authors' strong views about what is rational ignore
values that rational people possess. For example, as evidence of
human irrationality, they cite studies indicating that consumers value
a reduction in the risk of injury from a household chemical product
from 5/10,000 to zero, more than they value a reduction from 15/
10,000 to 5/10,000.65 But the argument that this preference is irra-
tional assumes that the only cost of the injury risk is the harm the
injury causes. It ignores the harm that the threat of injury causes. Re-
ducing a risk to zero reduces both worry and the costs of taking pre-
cautions that minimize worry. Reducing, but not eliminating, a risk
may still leave these costs; hence it is not irrational to place a substan-
tial premium on eliminating a feared risk entirely. It is often the case
that eliminating the last vestiges of a risk, such as a risk of disease, is
more expensive than reducing the risk from a moderate to a low level,
but eliminating risks entirely is often a political goal, and our willing-
ness to spend toward this end may rise as the goal is approached. If
jurors place a special value on eliminating risks, they are not acting
unreasonably. Hastie and Viscusi's perspective on rationality is not
that of either the political or legal system. Nor does the research that
Hastie and Viscusi cite indicate that juries that are told of a defend-
ant's efforts to eliminate risk will underestimate the degree of risk re-
duction the defendant has achieved. Absent research that uses more
ecologically valid stimuli, such as simulated trials, we do not know
what juries will do, nor, if the tendencies Hastie and Viscusi point to
actually affect jury decision making, whether these effects are so
strong as to justify changing the tasks we assign juries.
Hastie and Viscusi also suggest that juror assessments of the likeli-
hood that an event will occur will inappropriately increase with the
severity of its consequences. In particular, they suggest that when an
accident has had severe consequences, the jury will believe that the
apparent chance of the accident ex ante was higher than it would have
seemed had less damage been done, or, perhaps, that the accident was
more easily avoidable. 66 In deciding whether an accident resulted
from negligence, the jury, according to Hastie and Viscusi, should
make risk calculations uninfluenced by the fact that an accident oc-
curred, and it should decide whether the risk was justified not on the
basis of the harm actually done, but in light of the amount of harm
that would have been expected ex ante given the apparent risk. The
authors cite no research that suggests juries decide in the way they
65. Id. at 911.
66. Id. at 911-12.
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fear, and do not mention their failure to find such an effect in their
own study. Their study included a low harm condition in which the
railroad accident caused $240,000 in damages and a high harm condi-
tion in which the accident caused $24,000,000 in damages. 67 This dam-
age manipulation had no significant effect on juror verdicts or any
other of their outcome measures. Hence the authors' own research,
perhaps the sole empirical study that bears on their fear, suggests
there is no cause for concern. I would not, however, dismiss this con-
cern based on their study's results, just as I would not treat this study
as strong evidence for the existence of worrisome hindsight problems.
But the failure of the authors' results to support their fears empha-
sizes how speculative and relatively unsupported by empirical re-
search their laundry list of concerns is.
The authors also suggest (without citation) that people overreact to
risks associated with new technologies, to risks that increases status
quo risk levels, and to risks associated with highly publicized events.68
With respect to the first two, it seems difficult to know whether people
overreact because when we have little experience with a risk, it is hard
to know what the appropriate reaction is. A jury which expects spe-
cial care when risks are novel is not acting improperly, for a similar
perspective operates in various regulatory arenas, as in, for example
the special requirements, arguably not justified on efficiency grounds,
that new drugs must meet before they are marketed. A jury which
shares values firmly embedded in the political system is not, on this
account, an irrational actor. Moreover, taking an ex post perspective
when judging actors who create uncertain risks that are later realized
may be wise on efficiency grounds as well. It counters actor incentives
to downplay or ignore risks that might interfere with getting a profita-
ble product quickly to market. A strong commitment to an ex ante
perspective might encourage corporations and other actors to forego
gathering risk relevant information since if something goes wrong it is
hard to hold an actor at fault if it had no idea an accident might hap-
pen. While, in theory, risk creators might be made to pay for failing to
adequately evaluate the risks they were creating, this can be very hard
to prove. The prospect of punitive damages if something goes very
wrong may effectively balance the biases promoted by self interest
and short time horizons and so may prevent risks from being realized,
which is ordinarily better than compensating for them afterwards.
67. Hastie et al., supra note 30, at 2.
68. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 912.
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Whether juries overestimate the ex ante risks associated with highly
publicized events is hard to say. It is, despite the authors' suggestion,
not at all clear that juries in the asbestos cases have overestimated the
risks that the companies mining and using asbestos would have per-
ceived had they tried responsibly to gather information on the safety
of their product. With respect to other highly publicized risks, such as
Bendectin and tobacco, most juries hearing cases arising from these
risks have found for the defendants. 69
Another weakness of Hastie and Viscusi's argument is that they
treat risks and information about them as givens rather than as the
results of dynamic social processes. We are told, for example, that a
preference for known risks (e.g., 2/1000 of a chance of harm) over
more ambiguous risks with an equivalent expected likelihood of harm
(e.g., a 50:50 chance of a risk that is either 1/1000 or 3/1000) means
that juries will be inclined to be particularly harsh in situations of am-
biguity and uncertainty; although, according to the authors, liability
standards should be more lenient because precautionary behavior is
more difficult when a risk's characteristics are ill-defined.70 What the
argument ignores is a risk creator's ability to reduce the ambiguity of
a risk it is creating through monitoring, research, and experience. Pu-
nitive damages may be valuable because their prospect induces risk
creators to reduce the ambiguity about the degree of risk they are
creating. If following the authors' suggestion, the standard for liability
were less strict when risks were ill defined, opportunistic risk creators
would have an incentive to avoid learning more about the degree of
risk they are creating. Where a risk has an apparent 50:50 chance of
being either 1/1000 or 1/3000 it may be both wise and appropriate to
hold the risk creator to a risk probability of 1/1000 unless the creator
can show not only that the risk was ambiguous but also that taking
steps to reduce the ambiguity was impossible or unreasonably costly.
Since we are dealing with only risks that have been realized, we have
reason to believe that the higher risk probability was the more accu-
rate one.
69. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentives-Based Regulations, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1171 n.28 (1998) ("The plaintiffs in those
suits [against the tobacco industry] alleged that cigarettes caused their illnesses and injuries,
allegations that rang hollow for many judges and juries who apparently concluded that smokers
had no one to blame but themselves."); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study
in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 361 (1992) ("The fact that far fewer
[Bendectin] cases have been filed is a consequence of the lack of plaintiff success in the cases
that have been tried.").
70. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 1, at 912-13.
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The authors also assert that juries are prejudiced against cost/bene-
fit analyses, but except for a judge's speculation and some anecdotes
reported in a newspaper article, they provide no evidence that compa-
nies that use cost/benefit analyses risk punitive damages by doing so.
As they recognize in referring to the Pinto case, a jury's reaction to a
cost/benefit analysis may respond more to the values a company rec-
ognizes in its analysis and, in particular, to the self-serving nature of
some of them, than to the technique per se.71
CONCLUSION
In sum, the authors' attempt to canvas the literature on the foibles
of human decision making and their attempt to draw from this litera-
ture implications for the jury's role in setting punitive damages is as
unpersuasive as their similar willingness to draw powerful policy im-
plications from their empirical study. Moreover, nothing in the litera-
ture they review suggests that judges will do better than jurors in
assessing punitive damages. Indeed, to the extent discussion can alle-
viate some of the systematic shortcomings of human decision making,
judges deciding alone should be more vulnerable to these shortcom-
ings than jurors deciding collectively. Nevertheless, Hastie and Vis-
cusi argue that judges, not juries should set punitive damages, if we
are to have punitive damages at all. But neither their empirical study
nor their review of the psychological literature on cognitive biases
show that judges are cognitively superior to juries.
This does not mean that Hastie and Viscusi's preferred system
would be worse than the current one in terms of risk management or
even from a retributive justice perspective. One must always be open
to reliable empirical evidence which supports proposals for changes in
how we do our legal business. The problem with resting a major pol-
icy change on Hastie and Viscusi's article is that their empirical study,
which seeks to compare jurors and judges, provides no reliable evi-
dence of a difference favoring judges, and the evidence from the cog-
nitive bias literature they review does not address the judge-jury
difference at all. Social science evidence can support legal change, but
there is properly a heavy burden on those who offer social science
evidence for this purpose. Hastie and Viscusi's work does not come
close to meeting this burden. Although the authors say they are "con-
servative" in advocating removing decisions from the jury,72 they are
71. Id. at 914.
72. Id. at 917.
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quite radical in what they advocate, given the quality of the evidence
they adduce.
I can think of no instances in which a single study can justify chang-
ing a familiar legal institution. Even excellent research that is directly
on point should be replicated in different contexts before policy mak-
ers rely on what social science researchers have found. Legal institu-
tions operate across a variety of contexts, and research results can be
context specific. Researchers of the caliber of Hastie and Viscusi
know this. Thus, it is hard to understand why they present an initial
small step in exploring an interesting issue as if it were the last step
needed to justify substantial legal change.
Perhaps it is because on theoretical grounds, apart from the re-
search they report and review, Hastie and Viscusi are skeptical about
the value of punitive damage awards,73 and they are concerned that
high punitive damage awards can be counterproductive in terms of the
incentives they create. 74 Their policy recommendations suggest that
they believe their concerns will be alleviated if judges rather than ju-
rors set punitive damage awards. The support they think their hind-
sight study gives this recommendation indicates that they expect
judges to award punitive damages less frequently than juries, and to
award them in more modest amounts. This could happen if their rec-
ommendation that judges and not juries set punitive damages were
adopted. But if it did happen, I do not think it would be because
judges are more rational than juries or less susceptible to cognitive
biases. Neither their study nor their review of literature makes this
case. If judges can be expected to be more restrained than juries in
awarding punitive damages, it is because judges are educated differ-
ently than jurors, generally have different class backgrounds, and,
thus, have different values and experiences-perhaps including the ex-
perience of attending a corporation-funded law and economics train-
ing program.
There are, however, serious systemic dangers in turning over to
judges decisions on punitive damages. One safeguard in the system is
removed, as judges will no longer pass on the reasonableness of jury
awards, which provides a check on the possible idiosyncracy of both
judicial and lay views about what level of punitive damages is appro-
priate. Also, in cases where punitive damages are sought, settlement
negotiations will be more affected than they now are by the happen-
stance of which judge happens to be assigned a particular case, and
73. They conclude their article by suggesting that maybe punitive damages should be abol-
ished entirely. Id. at 918.
74. Id. at 913-14, 917-18.
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the power of judges to coerce defendants to settle is likely to rise dra-
matically. Moreover, having judges award punitive damages gives the
plaintiff's trial bar, on the one hand, and corporations like Exxon, on
the other, a powerful incentive to lobby for and against candidates for
judicial office based on their likely attitudes regarding punitive dam-
ages. In those states that elect judges, the quality of judicial elections
might change, and in judicial appointment states, a voice in selecting
trial judges is more likely to become a reward that some of a gover-
nor's important financial backers seek. Where judges must be re-
elected or reappointed, high profile decisions on punitive damages
may be made with an eye to pleasing special constituencies important
to a judge's prospects for reelection or reappointment. Ultimately,
Hastie and Viscusi's suggestion to give the task of setting punitive
damages to judges may threaten judicial integrity, and is also not pro-
rationality nearly so much as it is anti-democratic.
